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I. INTRODUCTION
In April of 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit published
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a decision in the matter of Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.1 The
decision was an important precedent in the application of the 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 written description requirement for patents on genetic material.
The holding was unremarkable and followed logically from the Federal
Circuit’s previous application of the written description requirement to
DNA patents.2 What was surprising was that by July 2002, in a rare
example of a court’s overruling itself, the court had reversed its April
2002 decision.3 The subsequent decision was, in many aspects, a
fundamental departure not only from the prior holding but also from
recent decisions relating to the written description requirement.4 Of
particular interest in the second ruling were the following: the court’s
unusual reliance on the Patent and Trademark Office Guidelines (PTO
Guidelines) rather than prior case law, the allowance of a biological
deposit as sufficient for compliance with the written description
requirement, the possible allowance of a description by function, and a
new articulation of the written description requirement as more than a
showing of possession. This Article will examine the recent history of
the ways in which courts have applied the written description
requirement to gene patents with a particular focus on the changes in the
law wrought by the Enzo decision.
II. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
The United States patent system functions on the rationale of quid pro
quo, by which the law grants a temporary monopoly on the production
and use of an invention in exchange for the knowledge of the invention’s
being made public.5 This quid pro quo depends upon the inventor’s
providing adequate disclosure of the invention, which includes a written
description of the invention6 and information on how to make and use
it.7 In order to ensure adequate disclosure, the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 requires that a patent application disclose a written description of
the following: the invention, how to make and use the invention, and the
best mode for use of the invention.8 This written description aspect of
1. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 71–77.
3. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2002).
6. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (1996).
7. CHISUM, supra note 5, § 7.01.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Paragraph one states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
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§ 112 is commonly referred to as the “written description requirement.”9
The written description requirement originated with the Patent Act of
1790,10 which required that each patent have “a specification in writing,
containing a description.”11 Because certain aspects of the Patent Act of
1790 were perceived as inefficient,12 it was replaced just three years later
by the similarly titled Patent Act of 1793.13 The new act slightly
modified the language of the written description requirement14 by
requiring a party that wished to obtain a patent to “deliver a written
description of his invention, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to
distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable
any person skilled in the art or science . . . to make, compound and use the
same.”15 In 1822, the U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Eaton construed
this language as containing two separate requirements.16 In modern usage,
these requirements are known as the enablement requirement and the
written description requirement.17 The Court stated that the objective of
the written description requirement is “to put the public in possession of
what the party claims as his own invention.”18 The Court also determined
that the written description must define the limits of what had been
patented, explaining that the inventor “ought to describe what his own

Id.

forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

9. Williams v. Gen. Surgical Innovations, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (E.D.
Tex. 2002). “[T]he three requirements of § 112 . . . in patent law parlance are
commonly referred to as the written description requirement, the enablement
requirement, and the best mode requirement.” Id.
10. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 2 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
11. Id. at 110.
12. Amusingly, the Patent Act of 1790 required the Secretary of State, the
Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General to examine every patent
petition and vote as to whether it was “sufficiently useful and important.” E.C.
Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST. 3
(1998), at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/walter40.html. If the Patent
Act of 1790 were still in effect today, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and John
Aschroft would be required to examine and vote on all patents.
13. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 318, 321–22 (1793) (repealed 1836).
14. See, e.g., Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Biotechnological Gene Patent
Applications: The Implications of the USPTO Written Description Requirement
Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1061 (2000).
15. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822) (quoting Patent Act of
1793 § 3) (alterations in original).
16. Id. at 433–34.
17. CHISUM, supra note 5, §§ 7.03–.04.
18. Evans, 20 U.S. at 434.
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improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement.”19
After Evans, courts began to develop the practice of drafting central
claims that succinctly state what has been invented and define the limits
of the invention with reference to more substantial descriptions
contained elsewhere within the application.20 The Patent Act of 1836
codified this practice of drafting claims.21 After 1836, the importance of
claims continued to increase although the written description was still
considered the central feature of the patent document.22 Ultimately, the
role of the written description in delineating the limits of the invention
was usurped entirely by the use of claims with the Patent Act of 1870.23
Stripped of its role of defining the limits of the patent, the written
description requirement became a historical anachronism for almost one
hundred years until it was resurrected by In re Ruschig 24 in 1967. 25 In
Ruschig, the court used the written description not to determine the
limits of the patent, but to ascertain whether the patent conveyed “clearly to
those skilled in the art” that the inventor had invented what was claimed.26
Since Ruschig, the understanding that the written description
requirement “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed” has endured.27
Ruschig’s conceptualization of the purpose of the written description
requirement has evolved in the common law into a specific test: In order
to satisfy the requirement, the application must describe the invention
with adequate specificity to allow a person skilled in the art to know that
the inventor had been in possession of the claimed subject matter at the
time of the application.28 Until Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,29
19. Id. at 435.
20. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 619–20 (1998).
21. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 1 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870). When the
practice of claims drafting was codified by the Patent Act of 1836, “it was understood as
merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the courts.” Karl B.
Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 143 (1938); Craig
Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 n.50 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Jason M. Okun, Note, To Thine Own Claim Be True: The Federal
Circuit Disaster in Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
1335, 1344 (2000).
23. Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description
Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Company, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1301 (1999).
24. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
25. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 620 (1998).
26. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 996.
27. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting
In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see infra text accompanying note 121.
28. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
29. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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recent case law had continually reinforced the understanding that, as
applied to patents on genetic material, the written description requirement
was satisfied by a showing of possession.30
III. THE RECENT CASE LAW
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.31 was one of the earliest
cases to influence the evolution of the written description requirement
for patenting genetic material. In Amgen, the plaintiff alleged that
Genetics Institute, in collaboration with Chugai Pharmaceuticals, had
infringed a patent held by Amgen that claimed the nucleotide sequence
that expressed human erythropoitien (EPO), a protein that stimulates the
production of red blood cells.32 The Amgen patent claimed “[a] purified
and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence
encoding human [EPO].”33 Genetics Institute argued that it had been the
first to invent the disputed nucleotide sequence because it had conceived
a method for the isolation of the DNA for EPO prior to Amgen.34 The
court found that, although Genetics Institute had conceived of a potential
method for isolating the EPO gene prior to the Amgen patent, the
company did not have “an adequate conception of the DNA sequence.”35
The court further noted that the inventor for Genetics Institute did not
have adequate conception at the time of application because “he did not
then know the sequence of the gene encoding EPO.”36 The court held
that “when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of
a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method
30. See infra Part III.
31. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 1203.
33. Id. at 1204. Genetic information is stored in DNA in the form of a sequence of
nucleotide bases, either adenine, thymine, cytosine, or guanine. Each nucleotide will
only recognize its complementary base, so that adenine complements thymine and
cytosine complements guanine. The nucleotides are organized in codons, sequences of
three base molecules that each correspond to a specific amino acid. The sequence of
codons in a gene therefore only codes for the sequence of amino acids in the protein. In
order for a protein to be expressed by the host organism, the genetic information
contained in its strand of DNA is first transcribed to a strand of complementary
messenger RNA (mRNA). The mRNA is then “translated” or read by tRNA molecules
in the ribosome, leading to the assembly of the corresponding amino acid sequence and
expression of the protein product. See OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, PRIMER ON MOLECULAR GENETICS 6–9 (1992).
34. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205.
35. Id. at 1207.
36. Id.
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for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to
practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.”37 Stated
in other terms, Amgen allowed two methods of conception of a gene: (1)
actual knowledge of the nucleotide sequence sufficient to distinguish it
from others with a method for obtaining it, or (2) actual isolation of the
gene.38
The requirements for conception articulated in Amgen were joined
specifically to the written description requirement for patents on genetic
material in Fiers v. Revel.39 In Fiers, three separate inventors all
claimed patent rights to DNA encoding “human fibroblast betainterferon [], a protein that promotes viral resistance in human tissue.”40
The Fiers court applied the conception standards for DNA patents that had
been defined in Amgen directly to the written description requirement by
stating, “one cannot describe what one has not conceived.”41 The court
understood Amgen to hold that “conception of a DNA, like conception of
any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than
by its functional utility.”42 The clear implication was that one could not
adequately describe a DNA by its function.43 According to the Fiers
court, conception required a description based on “structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties.”44
The Fiers court also emphasized that the written description must
establish that the inventor had been in possession of the claimed DNA at
the time of the patent application.45 The court specified criterion for
37. Id. at 1206.
38. Although the Amgen decision discusses “conception” rather than the “written
description requirement,” this decision relates to the written description requirement
because the concept of conception essentially stood as a proxy for the more commonly
used term of “possession.” Establishment of possession is the purpose of the modern
written description requirement. This connection is articulated by Fiers v. Revel, 984
F.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See infra text accompanying notes 34–43.
39. 984 F.2d 1164.
40. Id. at 1166. Fiers was an interference involving three groups of foreign
inventors: Walter C. Fiers of the United Kingdom; Michel Revel and Pierre Tiollais of
Israel; and Haruo Sugano, Masami Muramatsu, and Tadatsugu Taniguchi of Japan. Id.
at 1166–67. All three groups sought priority for their patent applications based on the
filing date of the foreign patent applications they filed in their respective countries. Id.
41. Id. at 1171.
42. Id. at 1169.
43. Id. at 1171. In reference to a description that purported to cover all DNA that
coded for beta-interferon, the court held, “Claiming all DNA’s that achieve a result
without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description
requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.” Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1170. The court stated that the patent board had correctly set forth the
legal standard for sufficiency of description. Id. The patent board had held:
[W]hat is needed to meet the description requirement will necessarily vary
depending on the nature of the invention claimed. The test for sufficiency of
support is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon “reasonably
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establishing possession, stating that “[a]n adequate written description of
DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention
and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a
description of the DNA itself.”46 Ultimately, the Fiers court awarded
patent rights to the one inventor of the three who had described the exact
nucleotide sequence of the DNA.47 Although the court did not state that
the written description requirement required an inventor to disclose the
exact nucleotide sequence, the facts of the case tended to support that
interpretation.48
Prior to Enzo, the last case to define the written description
requirement as it relates to patents on genetic material is Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.49 In Eli Lilly, the court
invalidated a University of California-owned patent, which claimed a
prokaryotic host containing insulin encoding DNA for mammals,
vertebrates, or humans, for failure to satisfy the written description
requirement.50 The patent described the nucleotide sequence for insulin
DNA in a rat, but described the rest of the genus, including human, only
by function.51 Citing Fiers, the court held that a description of the
conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later
claimed subject matter.”
Id. The court rejected the patent application of Revel because the description did not
establish possession. Id. at 1171. “A bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it
can be obtained by reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that
Revel was in possession of the DNA.” Id.
46. Id. at 1170.
47. Id. at 1172. The court gave priority to Haruo Sugano, Masami Muramatsu,
and Tadatsugu Taniguchi of Japan, stating:
We also conclude that Sugano’s application satisfies the written description
requirement since it sets forth the complete and correct nucleotide sequence of
a DNA coding for ß-IF and thus “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [Sugano] was in possession
of the [DNA coding for ß-IF].”
Id. (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991))
(alterations in original).
48. The conclusion that a description of the nucleotide sequence of a DNA patent
was required by the holding in Fiers is supported by the fact that all three patent
applications disclosed a means of isolating the DNA, but priority was granted to the one
patent that actually described the nucleotide sequence. Id. The court clearly stated that
to fulfill the written description requirement, a plan for isolating the DNA was not
enough, holding that “what is required is a description of the DNA itself.” Id. at 1170.
The court gave no indication of what would suffice as a “description of the DNA itself”
except description of the nucleotide sequence. Id. at 1172.
49. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
50. Id. at 1562.
51. Id. at 1567. Although the University of California patent did provide a general
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DNA’s function was not sufficient, stating that “definition by
function . . . is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition
of what achieves that result.”52
Eli Lilly also seemed to further establish the rule that a DNA can only
be described by a recitation of the nucleotide sequence.53 The court in
Eli Lilly understood Fiers as requiring “[the] kind of specificity usually
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that
make up the cDNA.”54 In terms of patenting a genus, the court stated:
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a
representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within
the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the
members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.55

In other words, the applicant must disclose the entire sequence of a
sufficient number of cDNA’s to represent the entire genus or a
substantial portion of the nucleotide sequence for every member of the
genus. Beyond that, the court refused to speculate about other ways by
which DNA could be properly described.56
After Eli Lilly, a wide variety of commentators anticipated that a
recitation of the exact nucleotide sequence was now necessary to fulfill
the written description requirement for patents on genetic material.57
Although the court in Eli Lilly did not explicitly adopt a bright-line rule
that disclosure of the nucleotide sequence was required, the wording of
the case effectively left disclosure of the sequence, or at least large
portions of the sequence, as the only certain option. In the exact
method for obtaining the cDNA that encodes for human insulin, the court did not
consider it to be a written description of the DNA itself, but rather a potential disclosure
of enablement. Id. The cDNA itself was only described by the protein that it encoded,
which is a description by function. Id. at 1568.
52. Id. (citing Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169–71).
53. See, e.g., Courtney J. Miller, Comment, Patent Law and Human Genomics, 26
CAP. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997). “The decision in Lilly appears to foreclose any further
gene claims methods other than disclosure of the actual gene sequence.” Id.
54. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 917 (“The decision in Lilly appears to
foreclose any further gene claims methods other than disclosure of the actual gene
sequence.”); Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and
Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1259 (2000); Emanuel Vacchiano, Comment, It’s a
Wonderful Genome: The Written-Description Requirement Protects the Human Genome
from Overly-Broad Patents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 805, 817 (1999); Dorothy R. Auth,
Are ESTs Patentable?, 15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911, 912 (1997) (stating that the
Lilly decision “suggests that the new standard for the written description requirement—at
least in the courts—may well be that sequences claimed must be provided in the
specification”); Eliot Marshall, Courts Take a Narrow View of UC’s Claims, 277
SCIENCE 1029, 1029 (1997).
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wording of the court, “An adequate written description of a DNA . . .
‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical
name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the
claimed chemical invention.”58 This wording essentially narrows the
options to disclosing the nucleotide sequence, because DNA has no
distinctive structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties
other than its nucleotide sequence.59 DNA is a molecule comprised of a
double helix structure formed by complementary base pairs of
nucleotides.60 What distinguishes one DNA from another is the pattern
of the nucleic acids that form the complementary base pairs of the
double helix structure.61 As a result, any request for a description of
DNA sufficient to distinguish it from other DNA, without relying on
function, is almost ipso facto asking for the nucleotide sequence.62
IV. ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. V. GEN-PROBE INC.
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,63 Enzo Biochem sued the
defendants, Gen-Probe, Chugai Pharmaceutical, Biomerieux, and Becton
Dickinson, for violation of Enzo’s patent, which claimed nucleic acid
probes that selectively hybridize to Neisseria gonorrhoeae, the genetic
material of the bacteria that causes gonorrhea, over Neisseria
meningitidis.64 Detection of gonorrhoeae is difficult because N.
gonorrhoeae has between eighty and ninety-three percent homology
58. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
59. OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. RESEARCH, supra note 33, at 6.
60. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171
NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
61. DONALD VOET & JUDITH G. VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY 793–804 (1990). Although
there are levels of complexity to the structure of DNA that extend beyond the basic
double helix structure, those elements are related to the storage and regulation of DNA
within the cell. J.R. Pollack & V.R. Iyer, Characterizing the Physical Genome, 32
NATURE GENETICS 515, 515-21 (2002). It is unlikely that those portions of the DNA will
be used for patentable subject matter.
62. One suggested alternative is to describe a DNA sequence by its number of
bases coupled with a detailed restriction map. See Mark J. Stewart, Note, The Written
Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 555 (1999). However,
this method provides very little descriptive information concerning the DNA and will
probably not suffice to fulfill the written description requirement. See Ex parte Maizel,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1664–65 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992) (discussing certain
descriptive terms which were found to be inadequate).
63. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
64. Id. at 1015–16.
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with Neisseria meningitidis; as a result, any probe capable of detecting
N. gonorrhoeae might also show a positive result when only N. meningitidis
is present.65 Enzo believed that because its probes exhibited a selective
hybridization ratio of greater than fifty, they would “hybridize to
virtually all strains of Neisseria gonorrhoeae and to no strain of
Neisseria meningitidis.”66 Enzo had deposited these “probes in the form
of a recombinant DNA molecule within an E. coli bacterial host at the
American Type Culture Collection.”67 The Enzo patent claimed the
three deposited sequences and all sequences with a preferential
hybridization ratio of Neisseria gonorrhoeae over Neisseria meningitidis
greater than five to one.68 The Enzo specification described the
invention only by reference to the deposited sequences and by their
preferential-hybridization ratio.69 The defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Enzo’s patent failed to meet the 35 U.S.C. § 112
written description requirement as a matter of law.70
A. The First Enzo Decision
In its original holding, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
clearly articulated the position that an invention may not be described by
its function in order to fulfill § 112’s written description requirement.71
Basing its decision largely on Eli Lilly, the court held that “[a]
description of what the genetic material does, rather than of what it is,
does not suffice.”72 The court further stated that, “an adequate written
description of genetic material ‘requires a precise definition, such as by
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, not a mere
wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.’”73 The court
did not see a distinction between describing a DNA by protein
expression and describing a DNA by hybridization, as both were
descriptions by function.74 As a result, the court held that the Enzo
claims were insufficiently described as a matter of law.75 In continuing
65. Id. at 1015.
66. Id. at 1016.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1018.
72. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
73. Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 1018–19.
75. Id. at 1018. In contrast to the holding of the court, the dissenting opinion by
Dyk argued that the real issue was not whether a nucleotide sequence could be described
by its function, but rather whether “one skilled in the art at the time the application was
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with the rule that a DNA patent can not be described by its function, the
court was in accord with its previous holdings in Fiers76 and Eli Lilly.77
Enzo argued that it had complied with the written description
requirement because the company had actually reduced the invention to
practice and had deposited the resulting sequence78 in a public
repository.79 This would seem a plausible argument in light of Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.80 because deposit in a repository
would necessitate isolation of the claimed gene. In Amgen, as discussed
above, the court had allowed two methods of establishing conception:
(1) actual knowledge of the nucleotide sequence sufficient to distinguish
it from others plus a method for obtaining it, or (2) actual reduction of
the nucleotide sequence to practice, which in that case would have
entailed isolation of the gene.81 The language in Amgen was imported to
the written description requirement in Fiers82 and later echoed in Eli
Lilly.83 Surprisingly, the court admitted that reduction to practice may
filed would understand the nature of the claimed invention from the written description.”
Id. at 1024. The author of the dissenting opinion felt that, although the invention was
described by its function, it identified a structural difference between the DNA of N.
gonorrhoeae and N. meningitidis. Id. at 1026. Furthermore, this was sufficient
information about the structure that it might have been “at least somewhat known to
those of skill in the art.” Id. Because a patent is presumed valid, the dissenter felt that
this was sufficient to raise an issue of fact and overcome summary judgment. Id.
76. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
77. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575; see also
Ex parte Maizel, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1667 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992) (“As
we view it, appellants’ description of the protein solely in terms of its biological
function . . . is insufficient to . . . place appellants in ‘possession’ [of the DNA
sequence].”).
78. “A deposit is a sample of biological material, needed to practice an invention,
that is given to a recognized depository so that after the patent issues anyone who wishes
to practice the invention will have access to the material.” Heidi L. Kraus, Article, A
Different New Matter Standard for Biotechnology Patent Applications Accompanied by a
Deposit, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 101, 112 (1997).
79. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir.),
vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
80. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 1206.
82. The Fiers court took the language from Amgen that referred to when an
invention had been conceived and applied it directly to the written description
requirement, holding, “As we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above . . . [i]f a conception
of a DNA requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties, as we have held, then a description also requires that degree of
specificity.” Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
83. Eli Lilly quoted the same phrase that Fiers attributed to Amgen, holding, “An
adequate description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure,
formula, chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
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establish possession,84 yet found that a showing of possession was not
enough.85 The court held that, in addition to showing possession, the
written description must adequately describe the claimed invention so
that a person skilled in the art could “visualize or recognize the identity
of the claimed subject matter.”86 This holding is unusual and without
precedent in the case law, and it is apparently founded on a novel
interpretation of the statute alone. In regard to the deposit, the court held
that “to require the public to go to a public depository and perform
experiments to identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory
requirement to describe one’s invention in the specification . . . . ‘[A]
deposit is not a substitute for a written description of the claimed
invention.’”87
By continuing to disallow describing a DNA patent by its function,
and by disallowing a description by reference to a deposit, the original
Enzo holding met the expectations of those who had understood the
previous rulings in Fiers and Eli Lilly to require disclosure of the
nucleotide sequence of the claimed DNA.88
B. The Second Enzo Decision
Subsequent to its first review of the case, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit allowed a rehearing and came to some very different
conclusions.89 The court overruled its previous holding in two key areas.
First, the court held that a patent may be described by its function if a
known correlation between function and structure exists.90 Second, the
court ruled that the written description requirement may be satisfied by
Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171).
84. Enzo, 285 F.3d at 1023. “Although an actual reduction to practice, assuming
one exists here, may demonstrate possession of an embodiment of an invention, it does
not necessarily describe what the claimed invention is.” Id.
85. Id. at 1020–21.
86. Id. at 1021.
87. Id. at 1021–22 (quoting Guidelines for Examination of Patent Application
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099,
11007–08 n.6 (Jan. 5, 2001)); see also Deposit of Biological Materials for Patent
Purposes, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,864 (Aug. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(“Where the invention involves a biological material and words alone cannot sufficiently
describe how to make and use the invention in a reproducible or repeatable manner,
access to the biological material is necessary for the satisfaction of the statutory
requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. 112.”).
88. See supra note 52.
89. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
90. The court adopted the position of the PTO that the written description
requirement can be met by “functional characteristics when coupled with a known or
disclosed correlation between function and structure . . . .” Id. at 1324 (quoting
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Application Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106).
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reference in the specification to a deposit of the genetic material in a
public depository when the practical difficulties of describing the genetic
material make a written description unavailable.91 In keeping with their
first decision, the court continued to hold that compliance with the
written description requirement is not fulfilled simply by disclosing
enough descriptive information to allow a person reasonably skilled in
the art to know that the inventor was in possession of the claimed
invention at the time of application.92 In addition, the applicant must
also disclose enough descriptive information to adequately describe or
identify the invention.93
1. Analysis of the Second Enzo Decision
a. Description by Function
In its second review of Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc., the court
acknowledged the prior precedent of Eli Lilly in finding that when gene
material “has been defined only by a statement of function or result . . .
such a statement alone did not adequately describe the claimed
invention.”94 The court also acknowledged Fiers v. Revel, which it
quoted for the rule that an adequate written description “‘requires a
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention.”95 However, unlike its previous holding, the court
did not find that these cases amounted to a rule that a nucleotide
sequence may not be defined by its function; rather the court oppositely
concluded: “It is not correct, however, that all functional descriptions of
genetic material fail to meet the written description requirement.”96 It is
difficult to imagine a more contrary rule that could have been
constructed based on the cited precedent. Rather, the court seems to
have based its conclusion not on those prior holdings, but purely on the
91. Id. at 1325. “[W]e hold that reference in the specification to a deposit in a
public depository . . . when it is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an
adequate description . . . .” Id.
92. Id. at 1329.
93. Id. at 1330.
94. Id. at 1324 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
95. Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,
1171 (Fed Cir. 1993))).
96. Id.

959

LINSTROM PAGES.DOC

1/9/2020 2:44 PM

persuasive authority of the PTO Written Description Guidelines.97 Legal
inconsistencies not withstanding, the court held:
In its Guidelines, the PTO has determined that the written description
requirement can be met by “show[ing] that an invention is complete by
disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e.,
complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties,
functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation
between function and structure, or some combination of such
characteristics.” . . . Thus, under the Guidelines, the written description
requirement would be met for all of the claims of the ‘659 patent if the
functional characteristic of preferential binding to N. gonorrhoeae over N.
meningitidis were coupled with a disclosed correlation between that function
and a structure that is sufficiently known or disclosed. We are persuaded by the
Guidelines on this point and adopt the PTO’s applicable standard for
determining compliance with the written description requirement.98

Outside the Guidelines, the court cited no authority for this change of
position.99 According to the explicit phrasing given by the court, the
written description requirement can be met with a description by
function when there is a known correlation between function and
structure.100 At first blush, this holding merely appears to be a simple
exception to the rule set forth in cases disallowing descriptions of DNA
by function; however, the court does not clarify exactly how exact the
correlation between the function and structure must be or how much
descriptive information that known correlation must yield.101 Because
the structure of DNA is entirely concerned with storage, transmission,
and transfer of genetic information,102 and because it is generally known
how the structure of DNA relates to its function,103 it could be argued
that there is always some known correlation between function and
structure although that known correlation might be extremely vague.
This leaves the holding open to an overly broad interpretation. It might
be a different matter had the court narrowly tailored the exception to
situations in which the specification describes stringent hybridization
ratios to a disclosed substrate, but the court did not adopt that
97. Id. at 1325.
98. Id. at 1324–25 (final emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
alterations in original).
99. The court’s understanding of the Guidelines here sharply contrasts with that of
its prior decision. In the first hearing, Enzo had argued that the binding affinity of their
sequences was a sufficient description under the Guidelines. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2002). In response, the court pointed out that the Guidelines were not binding and
stated, “The Guidelines do not provide that a nucleotide sequence may be defined only
by its function.” Id.
100. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324–25.
101. Id.
102. VOET & VOET, supra note 61, at 791–93.
103. Id.
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approach.104 Under the current phrasing of the Enzo decision, there is a
risk that the new exception will swallow the old rule that a description
by function does not suffice.
Allowing a description by function when the known correlation
between function and structure is vague will undoubtedly prove to be
unworkable. Whether the function is protein expression or hybridization,
patents that describe the subject matter by function will always be open
to the criticism that they are nothing more than a wish105 or an attempt to
preempt the future106 and patents that offer a description by function
with a known correlation to the structure of the DNA where that
correlation is vague will be open to the same criticism. As a result, it is
unlikely that courts will allow description by function unless the
correlation is very specific, such as when the claimed sequence
demonstrates a strict hybridization ration to a known sequence. Courts
will likely distinguish Enzo on its facts and understand Enzo’s statement
that a description by function will suffice when there is a known
correlation to structure to be mere dicta and not a statement essential to
the holding. Based on the facts of the case and the relevant portions of
the Guidelines upon which the court relied,107 the courts should
understand Enzo to mean that description by function can contribute to
the description of a DNA molecule when combined with other relevant
information such as a reference to a deposit, partial structure, or physical
properties, which would allow a person skilled in the art to know that the
inventor had been in possession of the claimed invention. Of course,
any description by function will be complicated by the curious addition,
beyond a showing of possession, that the Enzo court added to the written
description.108

104. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1327–28.
105. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). “[A]n adequate written description [of genetic material] ‘requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a
mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.’” Id. (quoting Fiers v.
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
106. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Claiming . . . a
result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description
requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”).
107. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324 (citing Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Application Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)).
108. Id. at 1330.
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b. A Demonstration of Possession Is Insufficient for the Written
Description Requirement
In the second Enzo decision, the court continued with its holding from
the original Enzo decision that a demonstration of possession was not
sufficient to meet the written description requirement.109 The court’s
ruling in this matter is problematic. To begin with, the holding was
based upon an erroneous reading of Lockwood v. American Airlines,
Inc.110 The Enzo court falsely stated that the Lockwood court had
rejected the rule that “all that is necessary to satisfy the description
requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention.”111
In fact, Lockwood had upheld this rule.112 The Enzo court misinterpreted
Lockwood as requiring, in addition to a showing of possession, a
“disclosure of ‘such descriptive means as words, structures, figures,
diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention.’”113
A correct reading of Lockwood is that possession is demonstrated by the
disclosure of sufficiently descriptive words, not that the descriptive
words are a requirement in addition to showing possession.114
Additionally, the notion that something beyond a showing of
possession is necessary to meet the written description requirement is
not consistent with the court’s prior decisions.115 It has been understood
by both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Patent and
Trademark Office that the written description requirement for genetic
and biotechnology patents demanded greater specificity to demonstrate
possession than other arts;116 however, it has been understood as a
109. The first decision held that a showing of possession was insufficient. Enzo
Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by 296 F.3d
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The vacating decision took an identical position, holding,
“Application of the written description requirement, however, is not subsumed by the
‘possession’ inquiry.” Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330.
110. 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
111. Enzo, 285 F.3d at 1020–21 (quoting Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572).
112. The court noted, “Lockwood argues that all that is necessary to satisfy the
description requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention.
Lockwood accurately states the test . . . .” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (citing Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
113. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572).
114. See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572. “‘The applicant must also convey to those
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the
invention . . . .’ One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures,
diagrams, formulas, etc.” Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64)
115. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64.
116. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (adopting the
Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences argument that
“what is needed to meet the description requirement will necessarily vary depending on
the nature of the invention claimed”); Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099,
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heightened requirement to demonstrate possession,117 not as a
requirement in addition to a demonstration of possession.118 Until the
first Enzo decision,119 the case law overwhelmingly had indicated that
the purpose of the written description requirement was to show
possession at the time of application.120 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit treated this topic in some depth in Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, in which the court observed:
Since its inception, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has frequently
addressed the “written description” requirement of § 112. A fairly uniform
standard for determining compliance with the “written description” requirement
has been maintained throughout: “ . . . The description must clearly allow persons of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.”121

The court continued, “[T]he test for sufficiency of support in a parent
application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon
reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that
time of the later claimed subject matter.”122
In acknowledging the understanding of the prior case law as explained
in Vas-Cath, the Enzo court suggested that the “possession” test was
“especially meaningful” in cases of later-filed claims.123 As a result, the
implication seemed to be that the possession test had not been the rule in
cases that did not involve later-filed claims.124 The court dared not press
this point too hard though, as the possession test had been applied to
original claims in Eli Lilly.125 Rather, the court made the point that
1106 (Jan. 5, 2001) (codifying that “for inventions in emerging and unpredictable
technologies, or for inventions characterized by factors not reasonably predictable which are
known to one of ordinary skill in the art, more evidence is required to show possession”).
117. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170–71.
118. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64.
119. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
120. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64.
121. Id. at 1562–63 (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989))
(second alteration in original).
122. Id. at 1563 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329.
124. Interestingly, it was the view of many commentators that it was inappropriate
to apply the written description analysis to originally filed claim, this view was
disappointed by the holding in Eli Lilly. See, e.g., Ren, supra note 23, at 1312.
125. Although the court in Eli Lilly did not specifically say it was applying the
possession test, it did. The court articulated the functional equivalent of the “possession”
test by stating, “To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must
describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly
conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’” Regents of the Univ. of

963

LINSTROM PAGES.DOC

1/9/2020 2:44 PM

while the question of showing possession has been viewed as the only
test in cases involving later-filed claims, it is not the only test in which
original claims are involved.126 Although this position had never before
been articulated, it is true that the vast majority of written description
cases have involved later-filed claims.127 This left open the possibility,
or at least the plausible legal fiction, that an additional requirement has
quietly existed all along without an opportunity to be explicitly stated.
The idea that the written description requirement may entail
something more than a mere showing of possession is neither without
some logical basis nor unanticipated, but the particular rationale used by
the Enzo court for introducing an additional requirement is novel.
Esteemed commentators have held the view that the written description
requirement not only serves to show possession of the invention, but
also serves a second purpose of giving “the public notice of the limits of
the patent in order to allow third parties to improve on and invent around
the patent without infringing.”128 This view of the written description, as
describing a limit to the scope of the patent, is actually a throwback to
the role that the written description requirement filled prior to the Patent
Act of 1870.129 As cases preceding Enzo relating to genetic patents130
began to require what was perceived as a higher degree of precision in
describing genetic patents,131 an enlarged view of the written description
requirement seemed to possess an almost subliminal presence in the
decisions. Commentators began to see as subtext that the written
description requirement was being used to limit the scope of the

Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Lockwood v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The court further cited to
Lockwood, which specifically stated the “possession” test. Id.; Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.
126. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1329.
127. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560 (“The cases indicate that the ‘written
description’ requirement most often comes into play where claims not presented in the
application when filed are presented thereafter.”).
128. Alison E. Cantor, Article, Using the Written Description and Enablement
Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 282 (2000).
129. See Mueller, supra note 25, at 619–20. “Absent claims as we know them
today, the written description provided notice to the public of the scope of exclusive
rights asserted by an inventor. Through the written description, the public was to be ‘put
in possession’ of the boundaries of a patentee’s asserted monopoly.” Id. After the
Patent Act of 1870, claims were used to define the limits of a patent and the written
description requirement became a historic anachronism until the modern use of the
requirement was established in In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Id. at 620.
130. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569; Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
131. In general, the standard for fulfillment of the written description requirement
for DNA-related patents and biotechnology patents is typically higher than for other
technological fields. See Cynthia M. Lambert, Note, Gentry Gallery and the Written
Description Requirement, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 109, 122 (2001).
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patent.132 In Enzo, limiting the scope of the patent was not in the court’s
contemplation. The court’s view is predicated on the concept that
“description is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must
receive meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from
practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”133 It appears that,
unlike previous conceptualizations of the written description
requirement, this new understanding has no utility other than as
description for description’s sake.134 Whereas previous requirements
required that the invention described show the inventor had actually
invented and was in possession of the invention,135 or describe the limits
of the claimed invention,136 this new requirement only requires that the
invention be described.137 As to what will suffice for an adequate
description, it is clear that the court intends to require essentially the
same amount of descriptive information as was required to establish
possession in Fiers and Eli Lilly,138 with two exceptions: the option of
showing possession by reduction to practice as indicated in Amgen139 is
eliminated as not being descriptive enough,140 and, in at least some
instances, the court will allow a reference in the specification to deposit
in a public repository.141
c. The Use of a Deposit to Fulfill the Written
Description Requirement
The Enzo court’s allowance of a deposit to fulfill the written
description is interesting, because the court did not allow the written
description to be fulfilled by reduction to practice; according to the
court, reduction to practice only establishes possession,142 which is
132. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 128, at 296–97; Vacchiano, supra note 57, at 824–25.
133. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
134. “A showing of ‘possession’ is ancillary to the statutory mandate that ‘[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention,’ and that requirement is
not met if, despite a showing of possession, the specification does not adequately
describe the claimed invention.” Id. (alteration in original).
135. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
136. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822).
137. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330.
138. See id. at 1324 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993));
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
139. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
140. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330.
141. See id. at 1325.
142. Id. at 1329.
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insufficient to adequately describe the invention.143 The court found that
a DNA invention can be adequately described in two ways: by a written
description of its relevant structure or physical characteristics144 or, in
some instances, the isolated sequence can be deposited in a public
repository and a reference to the deposit made in the specification.145
This holding is slightly incongruous because a deposit is very similar to
reduction to practice and is primarily useful for establishing possession,
not describing the invention.146
The court left open the question as to when a reference to a deposit
will be accepted to satisfy the written description requirement.147 The
language of the holding was not precise, and it may be argued that
reference to a deposit to meet the written description requirement is not
limited to occasions in which the written description is unavailable. The
exact phrasing of the court was as follows: “[W]e have concluded that
reference in the specification to a deposit may also satisfy the written
description requirement with respect to a claimed material.”148 On its
face, that statement does not require that the written description be
unavailable. The context of the statement, however, makes it appear that
the court intended to limit the use of a reference to a deposit to cases in
which the written description is unavailable.149 In laying out the rule,
the court drew an analogy between the use of a deposit for the written
description requirement and the use of a deposit to disclose
enablement.150 In the latter situation, a deposit is allowed only when the
inventions cannot reasonably be enabled by descriptions in written
form.151 Additionally, the court noted that the structures of the claimed
composition “may not have been reasonably obtainable and in any event
were not known to Enzo when it filed its application in 1986.”152 The
court also noted that it would have taken an estimated “3,000 scientists
one month” to sequence the deposited material, which would make a
143. Id. The court noted that the argument that “all that is necessary to satisfy the
description requirement is to show that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention” had been
rejected in Lockwood. Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
144. Id. at 1324.
145. Id. at 1326. “[R]eference in the specification to deposits of nucleotide
sequences describe those sequences sufficiently to the public for the purposes of meeting
the written description requirement.” Id.
146. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
147. See Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326–27. The ruling does appear to limit the use of a
deposit to instances where the invention “cannot reasonably be enabled by a description
in written form.” Id. at 1326.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1325–26.
151. Id. at 1326.
152. Id.
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written description of the composition “unduly burdensome.”153 Still,
the language is not as exact as it could be, and it leaves open the issue as
to the exact standards to determine whether providing a written
description is unduly burdensome, or whether a written description is
unavailable as a practical matter.
2. Reliance on the Guidelines
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Enzo court’s decision was
the unprecedented reliance on the Guidelines.154 Although only time
will reveal its full impact, the decision potentially represents a shift in
patent law jurisprudence of tectonic proportions. The decision extends
well beyond the written description requirement and could affect
virtually every area of patent law. Prior to the second Enzo decision, the
Federal Circuit had never relied upon or even taken judicial notice of the
Guidelines.155 It is true that courts have taken judicial notice of the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) as an official
interpretation of regulations on procedural issues.156 However, taking
notice of the MPEP does not adequately compare with taking notice of
the Guidelines, as the MPEP and the Guidelines play vastly different
roles in patent practice and law.
Patent lawyers and agents frequently use the MPEP in advising
applicants and in preparing filings.157 Patent examiners often cite
153. Id. at 1328.
154. Besides the Guidelines, the court did make reference to “the history of
biological deposits for patent purposes, the goals of the patent law, and the practical
difficulties of describing unique biological materials.” Id. at 1325. These references are
all very general and almost completely amorphous. For example, the history of
biological deposits does not suggest anything like the rule formed in the latest Enzo
decision. As the court pointed out, the previous status of a deposit had been that “[a]n
accession number and deposit date add nothing to the written description of the invention.”
Id. (quoting In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (alteration in original).
155. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir.),
vacated by 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1324.
156. Refac Int’l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
“The MPEP does not have the force and effect of law; however, it is entitled to judicial
notice as the agency’s official interpretation of statutes or regulations, provided that it is
not in conflict with the statutes or regulations.” Id.
157. “The Manual is published to provide U.S. Patent and Trademark Office patent
examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and representatives of applicants with a
reference work on the practices and procedures relative to the prosecution of patent
applications before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001 & Rev. 2003),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.
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provisions of the MPEP in their communications with patent applicants,
and the MPEP is understood to be the official interpretation of
procedural requirements at the PTO.158 For these reasons, the courts
have held that patent applicants should be able to rely on the MPEP in
good faith, and courts have taken judicial notice of it as the official
interpretation of procedural regulations.159 In contrast, the Guidelines
are intended to be a restatement of policy as enforced by the courts in
assisting Patent Office personnel in their review of patent applications.160
The Guidelines are drafted for internal use, and are not intended to be
actual legal authority that patent attorneys may rely upon for the
substantive requirements of a patent.161 Rarely cited by the courts, the
Guidelines have often been in conflict with the decisions of the courts
and are periodically modified to conform to recent case law.162
For patent applicants to claim that they relied upon the MPEP is a
completely different argument than a claim that inventors had relied
upon the Guidelines. The Enzo court did note that judicial notice of the
Guidelines can only be taken “to the extent [the Guidelines] do not
conflict with the statute.”163 However, because the meaning of statutes
is left to the interpretation of the judiciary,164 judicial notice of the

Id.

158. See, e.g., In re Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
While the MPEP is primarily published for internal use, it is also made
available to patent applicants and their lawyers as well as to the general public
through the Superintendent of Documents. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the manual is used frequently by patent lawyers and agents in advising
applicants and in preparing their various papers for filing in the Patent Office,
and also of the fact that examiners frequently cite provisions of the manual in
their communications with patent applicants.

159. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 n.7
(D.N.J. 2000).
160. “These Guidelines will be used by USPTO personnel in their review of patent
applications for compliance with the ‘written description’ requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112,
¶ 1 . . . . These Guidelines reflect the current understanding of the USPTO regarding the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, and are applicable to all
technologies.” Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C.
112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001).
161. Id. (“Because these Guidelines only govern internal practices, they are exempt
from notice and comment rulemaking . . . .”).
162. See, e.g., Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1999); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999); In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v.
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011–12 (N.D. Cal. 2001). But see
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 927 F. Supp. 502, 512 (D. Mass.
1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Signature, the federal court for the
District of Massachusetts relied upon PTO guidelines stating: “the Guidelines may be
persuasive authority.” Id. The court was later reversed in State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
163. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
164. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (“Our role is to
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Guidelines should only be observed to the extent that the Guidelines do not
conflict with the courts’ understanding of statutes.165 To use the Guidelines
to give a construction to the written description requirement contrary to
that previously observed by the courts is to give legislative authority to
the PTO and violate the better traditions of stare decisis.166 Because it
has always been understood by the courts, until now, that case law controls,
future litigants will be less certain of the means by which the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals will remedy the tension between the Guidelines
and case law. As a result, future outcomes will be less predictable.
V. CONCLUSION
The latest Enzo decision has clarified some issues, but ultimately
leaves the § 112 written description requirement for genetic patents in a
continued state of uncertainty. It is clear that a DNA can be described
by its function in certain instances, but it is not clear what those
instances are, except that stringent hybridization ratios to a disclosed
substrate will probably suffice.167 It is also clear that a reference to a
deposit can adequately describe a DNA; however, it is not certain
whether that will suffice only when the practical difficulties of
describing the genetic material make a written description unavailable,
or if it will be allowed on every occasion.168 The Enzo court probably
intended to allow a reference to a deposit only in cases in which the
written description is unavailable, but the court did not inform the public
when the procurement of the written description is so unduly
burdensome that the practical difficulties make the written description
unavailable.169 Finally, the court based its holding upon the persuasive
interpret the language of the statute enacted by Congress.”).
165. Refac Int’l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
166. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF
THE LAW (rev. ed. 1974).
Stare decisis is the most commonly used term for designating the AngloAmerican doctrine of precedent. This term is an abbreviation of the Latin
phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere (to stand by precedents and not
disturb settled points). Stated in a general form, stare decisis signifies that
when a point of law has been once settled by a judicial decision, it forms a
precedent which is not to be departed from afterward. Differently expressed, a
prior case, being directly in point, must be followed in a subsequent case.
Id. at 425.
167. See supra Part IV.B.1.a.
168. See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 150–54.
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authority of the patent Guidelines and reached a conclusion in striking
contrast to legal precedent.170 This newfound willingness to rely upon
the Guidelines leaves future litigants guessing as to whether they should
expect either the Guidelines or the previous case law to hold sway in
future decisions.171 In sum, the latest Enzo decision has shifted the
direction of the development of the written description requirement for
DNA patents, but it has also left us with even more uncertainty in the
law than before the ruling.

170.
171.
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See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 164–67.

